

**Pan-African Political and Economic Visions of
Development
From the OAU to the AU:
From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)**

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1. Introduction

A Vision is a mental picture of a desired future that an individual, a country/nation or a continent has. It is often articulated in a few sentences, for example, as a preamble to a document. Sometimes the future vision is captured in a short simple and catchy slogan. In general however, a vision is often accompanied by a long-term strategic plan on how to achieve the desired future.

The theme of this conference is on the various visions on Africa's development propounded during the last forty years, by both Africans and "Externals". Externals vary depending on the specific period and context – from the colonial powers to the former Soviet Union, the Americans, the UN and Bretton Woods institutions, "donors", the G8 and now the overused and meaningless term the "International Community". In this paper, "Externals" will be identified in the context of the discussion.

I will argue briefly that: (a) In the past, there were important differences between Africans' visions of their future development and the visions of development "Externals" had for Africa; (b) the visions of both Africans and "Externals" emanate from governments and not from the people. The African people generally have very little knowledge of the visions promulgated by their leaders on their behalf; (c) while in the past, there were substantive differences between the internal and external visions regarding the nature of development and ways of achieving it, recently the development vision of the "Externals" has won the day. NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) which articulates the latest "African vision" has, in essence, internalised the external vision and articulates it as a consensus African vision hailed by the "externals" – as represented by the G8 countries. The development vision of NEPAD is, essentially, the same vision of the type of development propounded by the "externals" in different languages since the time of independence.

NEPAD now articulates an approach to development, which is accepted by most African leaders, as well as the leaders of the G8 countries.

2. A History of African Visions

2.1 *The Pan African Congress and Its African Vision*

Since the last century African leaders – both in the Diaspora and in the Continent - began to view the continent as a ‘whole’ instead of as ‘fragmented pieces’. They also began to discuss continental development as opposed to piecemeal development in specific countries or specific regions of the continent. These views of the continent were slowly incorporated into the nationalist struggle and received their clearest articulation during the struggle for independence. The Pan-African Congress held in Manchester (in 1945) which brought together African nationalist leaders, as well as leaders from the Diaspora, gave the clearest expression of Africa’s vision in the following terms: (a) to achieve independence from colonial rule throughout the continent so that Africans can rule themselves democratically; (b) to achieve continental unity so that Africa can: (i) bring about faster economic growth and development to catch up with the industrialised countries, and (ii) be strong within the international system.

This Pan African vision was popularised at the sub-regional level as nationalist movements mobilised peasants and workers for the struggle against colonial rule. And the nationalist movements achieved their independence on the basis of this vision.

2.2 *The First OAU Vision*

When the OAU was created in Addis Ababa, in 1963, the Pan African vision was incorporated in its Charter. Indeed this vision became the subject of a heated debate at the 1963 meeting. The famous debate centered on a crucial element of the African vision namely should the political unity of the continent: (a) be realised immediately, or (b) be a long term objective to be achieved through the creation and consolidation of independent nation states first and then built up through sub-regional building blocks.

The debate was heated, Nkrumah of Ghana argued for immediate continental unity, while Nyerere of Tanzania argued for consolidating

nation states first. Nyerere won the day and since then nation building and economic development at country level were given priority throughout the continent.

Nevertheless, the goal of continental unity continued to be a powerful force in the OAU, in the Pan-African Movement and amongst a progressive section of intellectuals. Henceforth it continued to be a central element of all continent-wide visions and was restated in all African initiatives for continental development – including NEPAD.

Independent African countries added to the above vision several other elements such as eradication of poverty and disease, self-reliance and equity. It is fair to say that in the 1960s, most African countries proclaimed and propounded this vision.

Yet within the decade of the 1960s, there appeared a major division of African countries into two blocks i.e. the Monrovia and Casablanca blocks. The Monrovia block adopted a more radical vision of the future, emphasising faster continental political unity, self-reliance and equity, socialism being the main path to development. The Casablanca block, on the other hand, had a less radical vision that ignored issues of equity and self-reliance but emphasised nation building, and a laissez faire and open market depth path.

During the decade of the 1970s, the fierce Cold War going on in the world seriously affected African countries, many of which were forced to take sides in the ideological war. While in the 1970s African countries were not organised or associated into blocks such as Monrovia and Casablanca, they were nevertheless deeply divided between those which were Socialist, Marxist and Capitalist. The Socialist countries, such as Tanzania, were heavily influenced by the Social Democratic vision of Scandinavian countries; the Marxist and Capitalist countries were effectively influenced by the Soviets and American led Western visions of development respectively.

Africa's Economic Performance: 1960 – 1975

In 1975 the ECA undertook a four year detailed study of Africa's economic performance during the 1960-1975 period. Although performance during this period did not meet the targets set by the UN Second Development Decade, Africa as a whole performed well and certainly better than the subsequent 25 years 1975-2000.

During the 1960-75 period, Africa's GDP growth rate was 4.5%; its export growth 2.8% its agricultural growth 1.6%; and its manufacturing growth 6%.¹ According to Adedeji "*In retrospect, the period 1960-75 has, tragically, turned out to be Africa's golden era!*" (Adedeji 2002, p. 6).

By the end of the 1970s and despite this reasonable economic performance, there were clear signs that Africa was facing a serious economic crisis. "*What is clear to most observers, however, is that the strong optimism of the 60s concerning economic development, slowly gave way, first to hesitation, then to pessimism and by the end of the 70s to a consensus of gloom*" (Bujra, A. 1982, P.II).²

Late in the 1970s (1978) Adedeji had begun to make his gloomy predictions and warnings on Africa's economic prospects – predictions that have proved to be very accurate. "*Africa, more than other Third World Regions, is thus faced with a development crisis of great portent.... If past trends were to persist.....the African region as a whole will be worse off relatively to the rest of the world at the end of this century than it was in 1960*".³

And three years later (1981), the World Bank was making similar predictions. Africa, the World Bank states, was facing a "dim economic prospect" in the 1980s – virtually no growth in per capita income, if you are an optimist, and a negative rate of growth (-1.0% per year) if you are not.⁴

¹ Adebayo Adedeji "From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD and from the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither Africa?" Keynote Address at African Forum for Envisioning Africa Focus on NEPAD, Nairobi 26-29 April, 2002.

² Bujra, A. Editorial Note, Africa Development, Vol.VII, No.1/2, 1982, p.II.

³ Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of ECA, "Africa and the Development Crises" in Africa Guide, 1978, p.25.

⁴ World Bank Development Report 1981(NY OUP 1981), Table I.I

It was under these circumstances that Africa came up with its second and very important initiative for an alternative vision of development.

2.3 The Second OAU Vision

According to the ECA, African Governments had three options for facing “the anticipated crises”. Firstly to increase “self reliance and self-sustainment” and more effective measures for intra-African cooperation and mutual help. These measures “would require vision and statesmanship quite out of the ordinary”. Another option would take the form of a surreptitious surrender of the economy in return for substantial foreign aid, a temptation which might be impossible to resist”. “A third option would be to wait and see and hope whilst continuing with conventional measures which avoid creating antagonism” (ECA, 1979-1980, p.6).⁵

The OAU, in collaboration with the UNECA, mobilised African intellectual and political resources to discuss the crisis and the above options and came up with a vision and a plan of action for getting Africa out of the crisis for a better future. This serious effort led to the now famous Monrovia Declaration (1979), which articulated Africa’s vision of its future, the strategies of which were incorporated in the Lagos Plan of Action, and the Final Act of Lagos (1980). These three documents contained: (a) the most clearly articulated vision of Africa’s future, (b) a practical plan of action on how to achieve faster development towards that vision, and (c) political decisions supporting the vision and the plan of action, as well as achieving effective economic cooperation and integration.

The Monrovia Declaration (1979)

It provided the vision and scenario of Africa’s future. The Africa of 2000/2020 was to “have a high degree of self sufficiency, a democratic national development which will distribute the fruits of our efforts more equitably, will have a strong African solidarity and that Africa will carry more weight in world affairs” (OAU1979, p.30)⁶.

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)

⁵ ECA, Biannual Report of the Executive Secretary, 1979-1980.

⁶ “What Kind of Africa in the Year 2002?”, OAU, Addis Ababa, 1979

It provided the framework and strategies for implementing development programmes. The LPA based its strategies on some important principles to lead to an alternative form of development and to take Africa out of its crises. These principles use: -

1. Self reliance as the basis of development – at the national, sub-regional and regional levels;
2. Equity in the distribution of wealth at the national level as a fundamental objective of development;
3. Expansion of the Public sector viewed as essential for development;
4. As an unavoidable necessity, outside capital was to be directed to those areas where African capital is lacking or inadequate – such as mining, energy and large scale projects;
5. Inter-African economic cooperation and integration, being essential, was to be effected as soon as possible;
6. Change in the international economic order to favour Africa and Third World countries being essential, Africa should continue to fight for a NIEO (New International Economic Order).

On the basis of these principles, the LPA gave primacy to the development of Agriculture (first for food and then for export), Industrialisation (to satisfy basic needs), Mining Industries (to recover total and permanent sovereignty over national resources, and establish mineral based industries), Human Resources, and Science and Technology.

These principles and the detailed Programme of Plan of Action — were discussed extensively by Governments, as well as African intellectuals. The latter were generally critical of the details in the Plan but strongly supported the basic principles behind the LPA.⁷

The Final Act of Lagos (1980) and The Abuja Treaty (1991)

⁷ Bujra, Abdalla (ed.) “Africa Development”, A Quarterly Journal of CODESRIA, Vol.VII, No.1/2, 1982. A special number on the LPA. See Bujra’s Editorial P.I to VI.

The Heads of States and Governments of the OAU passed the special Final Act of Lagos, aimed at achieving an African Common Market by the year 2000. The issue of economic cooperation and integration was so important to the Governments that they felt the need to pass a special and separate Act. It was argued that without such economic cooperation and eventual integration of the generally small national economies of Africa, it would be impossible to achieve any meaningful alternative development as a way out of the crises. More importantly, without such cooperation and integration, Africa will not be strong enough to bring about any change, however small, in the existing international economic order. And such a change is crucial if Africa is to have any meaningful space to embark on an alternative form of development and overcome its crises.

The importance given to economic cooperation and integration led African leaders to transform, within ten years, the Final Act of Lagos to the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community in 1991. The treaty laid down in detail the process of achieving the Economic Community in successive stages over a period of 34 years. The Treaty clearly states that it takes into consideration the Monrovia Declaration, the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos. More importantly, in conducting inter-state relations, it affirmed adherence to the earlier principles enshrined in the LPA, some of which were listed as:-

- Equality and inter-dependence of Member States
- Solidarity and collective self-reliance
- Inter-state cooperation
- Peaceful settlement of disputes
- Recognition, promotion and protection of human and people's rights
- Accountability, economic justice and popular participation in development.⁸

Clearly the LPA continued to provide the inspiration of all future African visions and initiatives, until NEPAD.

⁸ OAU Treaty Establishing The African Economic Community, Abuja , Nigeria, June 1991.

2.4 The Third OAU Vision

The 1980 decade has been described as the “lost decade”. Africa was going through very serious economic and political crises – negative growth, collapsing economies, civil wars, collapsing states and state structures etc. And, as we will see below, the “international community” became very concerned with the “unending crises” which led to a belief that came to be called “Afro-Pessimism”. Implicit in Afro-Pessimism was the core idea that the African people – their societies, cultures, mindset and structures – are incapable of running their states and their economies and, therefore, were listed to remain in a permanent state of crisis – stagnation and negative growth.

Afro-Pessimism was born outside Africa and the idea was propagated both outside and inside Africa itself, by those with a vested interest in Africa remaining weak and disorganised for a long time.

The Africans, however, generally had a different view of their crisis – its causes, its continuation and the way out of it. While most Africans acknowledged that there were “internal” factors, which had contributed to their crisis and even its maintenance, they nevertheless put more emphasis on the “external” origin of their crisis and particularly their inability to get out of it. They argued that:

- (a) Colonialism had created the basic conditions of the crisis – dependent economies, distorted structures, artificial boundaries/countries; divided people, undeveloped human resources weak and undemocratic state structures.
- (b)** the international commodity markets, financial systems, the dominant role of the Western TNCs and the “five monopolies” enjoyed by the West (Amin 1995, p.47)⁹ were, and still are, extremely formidable barriers which weak African governments – individually or collectively – were and are unable to overcome.
- (c) given these conditions, in which the international system continuously reinforced African countries’ economic dependence

⁹ Amin, Samir “Africa and the Global System”. In Bujra, Abdalla (Guest Editor) of African Development Review (ADB), A Special Number on Africa and the Future; December 1995.

by maintaining their distorted structures and encouraging the chaotic political systems inherited from the colonial states, African countries found it very difficult to economically develop, create nation states and develop their human and natural resources.

- (d) the direct intervention of the Bretton Woods institutions and Donors in African economies through SAPs, ostensibly to help Africans overcome their crisis, simply perpetuated the unequal and exploitative relationship between Africa and the global system.

Given this general African perspective of their crisis, they invariably came up with initiatives, which started with basic strategies and appealed to change this unequal and harmful relationship. And the new approach to an alternative form of development, was clearly enunciated in the LPA's basic principles of development (see above).

Thus, since 1980, all African initiatives (from the OAU up to 1990), accepted the vision, framework, strategies and principles enshrined in the LPA. And to repeat, the vision behind the LPA and the Final Act, was articulated in the Monrovia Declaration (see above).

OAU: Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990: Addis Ababa, July 1985

And when in 1985, the OAU came up with its "Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990", it clearly stated that "While reiterating our full commitment to the principles and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos which are more valid today than ever, we have focussed... on a five year programme which consisted of:-

- measures for an accelerated implementation of the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos;
- special action for improvement of the food situation and rehabilitation of agriculture were emphasis to be an overcoming drought;
- measures to alleviate Africa's external debt;
- measures for a common platform for action at sub-regional, regional, continental and international levels; and measures for

action against the effects of the destabilisation policy of South Africa on the economies of Southern African States”.

It is to be noted that there is no mention of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) at all in the above document. The issue of Aid is clearly discussed and gratitude expressed to the Donors and the UN System.

This document, which was passed by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU in July 1985, clearly blames the external environment for the crisis in the shape of the debt burden and the apartheid government of South Africa in Africa, as exemplified/evidenced by the following quote:

“The dramatic increase in the volume of Africa’s external debt and the heavy debt burden is another source of our profound concern ...”.

“We are aware of the fact that shortcomings in development policies have contributed to the present debt crises. However, it is evident that the major causes of our country’s debt servicing problems are external ones and such causes are unfortunately beyond our control. These include, inter alia, the deteriorating terms of trade and the consequent reduction in export earnings for debt servicing, the unprecedented rise in interest rates, sharp exchange rate fluctuations, deteriorating terms of borrowing and the reduction in the flow of concessional resources, the combined effects of which resulted in net capital outflow from most of our Member States. In this regard the 26 African LDCs have been most seriously affected”(OAU, 1985.p.5).¹⁰

Incidentally this “Africa’s Priority Programme....” of 1985, was discussed and approved by the UN General Assembly in 1986 and was renamed the UN-PAAERD – 1986 (United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990).

The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) – UNECA, Addis Ababa, 1989

The “lost decade” of the 1980 was marked with two fundamental characteristics. Firstly, the widespread economic and political crises in

¹⁰ OAU, Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990. Published by FAO, 1985.

almost all African countries. Secondly, the strong intervention by the Bretton Woods institutions with the now discredited Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These SAPs were forced on African governments, with the aim of restructuring Africa economies. Strong armed tactics were used (by the WB/IMF) to force African governments, to accept the SAPs. The African people were, of course, not consulted by their Governments. The implementation of SAPs inflicted serious disruption on African countries economies and caused extensive immiseration of the African people. There was considerable opposition to SAPs from the people and African intellectuals, as is aptly described in the following ECA's AAF-SAP quote:

“Of course, as we look back at the 1980s, very few of us can doubt that we were, in one way or another, affected by SAPs that many of our countries have been pursuing. In some cases, the impact of such programmes has led to riots because of the tremendous suffering they imposed on the people: loss of jobs, reduction in social services, impossible increase in prices, generalised poverty and the constant threat of destabilising society as a whole. Indeed, these programmes continue to be formulated and implemented as if people do not matter” (ECA, AAF-SAP, p.v).

The UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), under professor Adedeji and acting more like an economic commission of the OAU rather than of the UN, reacted to the generalised African crises and the very widespread criticism and attack on SAPs, by producing a detailed document arguing for an Alternative Framework for Development. This was an alternative to SAPs and took the Bretton Woods programme point by point, countering these points with alternative policies, which, it was argued, would take Africa out of its present crisis. The central issue in this document was not only that the Alternative Framework and policies were to be very relevant to the African situation, but that SAPs were essentially perpetuating the African crisis by forcing a linkage of weak crisis ridden African countries to the powerful global system on terms which gave total advantage and dominance to the global system and nothing to African countries.

Needless to say that the AAF-SAP was strongly opposed and often roundly condemned by experts of the WB/IMF, as well as the Donor

community in general. A popular version of the AAF-SAP was produced (first printing was 20,000 copies). Despite this effort and the strong support the document received from both African governments and intellectuals, the AAF-SAP was marginalized and eventually followed the fate of previous African initiatives.

The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, Arusha 1990

As the Title of the Charter implies its basic objective is the democratisation of the development process in order to enable people's participation in the production process. The Charter came out of an International Conference organised by the ECA and was later adopted by the OAU.

“The Charter calls for the emergence of a new era in Africa – an Africa in which democracy, accountability, economic justice and development for transformation become internalised and the empowerment of the people, initiative and enterprise and the democratisation of the development process are the order of the day in every country. It delineates the actions that are required by all concerned – the people and their organisations, governments, African and non-African NGOs and the international community – to achieve the aforesaid objectives and also proposes national and regional mechanisms to monitor and report on the progress made in the implementation of the Charter” (Charter, Arusha 1990, p.1 and 2).¹¹

The core objective of the Charter was to inject a different approach in development thinking revolving around the idea that the actual participation of the people in the development and production processes, would bring about quicker economic growth, economic justice and general development. However, this can only be done and actualised if there is genuine democracy at all levels – at the grass roots, at the level of various organisations, enterprises and governments.

The Charter (the conference of which was organised by Adedeji, then Executive Secretary of the ECA and the driving force behind the AAF-SAP) continued the fight started by AAF-SAP against the Bretton Woods approach to development through SAPs. The Charter was taking up a

¹¹ African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation: Arusha, 1990

political issue with the WB/IMF and their SAPs, the argument of the Charter being firstly, the economic framework being forced on African governments was undemocratic and did not allow people to participate in the economic and development processes. In fact, under SAPs and their conditionalities, organised labour and professional associations, were being systematically destroyed, so that labour would not have the power to negotiate with owners of enterprises. This was an essential demand and condition of foreign investors. Secondly, the manner in which the economic reforms were forced on African governments was extremely undemocratic. Hence, the Charter insisted on the democratisation of the development and production processes by enabling the people to participate was not only essential, but was contrary to the Bretton Woods philosophy of development and its programme of economic reform. The Charter, therefore, logically argued that the democratisation of development and production processes, was an alternative approach, more likely to take African countries out of their present crisis than SAPs.

2.5 The Fourth OAU Vision

The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World. Addis Ababa, 1990

This was an important Declaration that also reacted to the continuous crisis facing African countries. The Declaration clearly articulated OAU's views on the changing nature of the international environment and the position of Africa in this environment. The OAU Heads of States and governments were seriously concerned with the negative impact of the international system on African countries. Like previous OAU Declarations and Initiatives, this 1990 Declaration argued that the main cause of the African crisis lay in the way Africa related to the international system – a relationship totally detrimental to Africa and therefore the cause of its deepening crisis. The concerns of the OAU were about two related aspects of the African crisis: -

- (a) deteriorating African economies'
- (b) the increasing number of internal conflicts – particularly armed conflicts and civil wars.

The declaration pointed out that “throughout the decade of the 1980s, most of our productive and infrastructural facilities continued to deteriorate. The per capita income of our people fell drastically.... There has been a sharp decline in the quality of life in our countries ... And this contrasted sharply with the alarming rise in Africa’s external debt ... which shot up from about US\$50 billion in 1980 to about US\$257 billion by the end of 1989”.

The intervention of the WB/IMF with their SAPs raised alarm bells with the OAU. “Most of our countries have entered into SAPs with the international financial and monetary institutions, mostly at heavy political and social costs... We are very much concerned that ... there is an increasing tendency to impose conditionalities of a political nature for assistance to Africa” (OAU, Declaration, 1990, p.2)¹².

The Declaration stated clearly the determination of African governments to pursue development on the basis of “self-reliant, human-centered and sustainable approaches based on social justice and collective self reliance to achieve accelerated structural transformation of our economies”. Furthermore, the governments were also “determined to rationalise the existing economic groupings in our Continent in order to increase their effectiveness in promoting economic integration and establishing an African Economic Community”.

These were objectives set in the LPA in 1980. We reaffirm their continued validity, as well as the fundamental principles of the LPA and Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER), including the sectoral priorities contained in them, in particular, the urgent need to attain self-sufficiency in food production, to promote science and technology for development and to establish a viable industrial base on the Continent. In this connection, we commit ourselves to the pursuit of sound population and environmental policies conducive to economic growth and development of our Continent”(Declaration, 1990,p.3).

It is important to note here that both the objectives and the sectoral priorities of the Declaration were very different from those of the SAPs.

In addition to these strong statements on the nature of the African economic crisis and the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in the perpetuation of the crisis, the OAU’s Heads of States made two important decisions on internal political issues , which were of great concern in the

¹² OAU, Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental changes Taking Place in the World, Addis Ababa, July 1990.

Continent – namely resolving all types of conflicts and supporting democracy.

These decisions were stated as follows: -

1. *“We ...renew our determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolutions of all the conflicts in our continent”.*
2. *“We...assert that democracy and development should go together and should be mutually reinforcing. It is necessary to promote popular participation of our people in the process of government and development”.*

Thus, without changing the OAU Charter, the Heads of States and Governments, for the first time, extended the scope of the OAU to intervene in internal conflicts of member states.

Secondly, the commitment to democracy is also very important since the OAU, for the first time made a choice on the type of political system preferred by sovereign member states.

The importance of this Declaration lies in the assertion that the OAU has to deal with the political problems of conflict and democracy as a necessary precondition to progress in economic development. It was after this Declaration that the OAU established, in 1993, the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Almost all the conflicts that the OAU was dealing with at the time were internal conflicts within member states – a departure from previous practice of dealing only with inter-state conflicts.

Despite this Declaration and the establishment of the Mechanism to resolve conflicts, conflicts continued to arise and the economies of most African countries continued to deteriorate in the 1990s. Hence, the OAU soon came up with another Initiative.

2.6 The Fifth OAU Vision

The OAU’s Relaunching of Africa’s Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action, OAU, 1995

In 1995 the OAU Heads of States and Governments met in Cairo in an Extra-Ordinary Session, to seriously review, analyse and reassess the root causes of economic and social problems, with a view to recommending remedial measures and lasting solutions that should be taken by African governments and peoples, with the support of the international community.

The Meeting, however, noted that for many years, the OAU had adopted many plans, strategies and programmes for the development of the countries, individually and collectively. "Unfortunately these plans were not adequately implemented by the majority of the countries...". The Meeting, therefore, called on African countries to rectify this situation.

Firstly people should be the centre and object of development. Secondly, governments should ensure the involvement of the people in the conception, implementation and monitoring of development plans, programmes and projects. Thirdly, special attention should be paid to the full involvement of women in the social and economic development efforts.

"Africa is a resilient continent and is a continent in transition. It has immense human resources. With a strong will, more determination, planning and vision, we can make Africa the economic power that it ought to be". And while the Meeting reaffirmed OAU's commitment to the LPA, it adopted the Cairo Agenda for Action for Relaunching Africa's economic and social development.

The Agenda for Action recommended: -

- (a) The achievement of democracy, governance, peace, security, stability and sustainable Development through promoting national unity, good governance, a policy of regionalisation and decentralisation, clarification of the role of government and the private sector in development, measures to eradicate the causes of refugees and displaced persons, and through maximum political and financial support of the OAU Mechanism for conflict Resolution;
- (b) Food Security;
- (c) Capacity Building and Human Resources Development;

- (d) Structural Transformation of African Economies – but once again reaffirming very different strategies and policies from those of SAPs;
- (e) Effective Mobilisation and Efficient Utilisation of Resources;
- (f) Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration.

Each of these areas was dealt with in greater detail with important suggestions on policy options. Most of the recommended actions and the policy options were, with slight variation, similar to those in the 1985 Africa Priority Programme and the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980. However, the ECA's AAF-SAP differed from the others initiatives in that it discussed specific policies and their implications as realistic alternatives to the policies then being implemented by SAPs.

2.7 The Sixth OAU Vision

The African Union (Sirte 1999, Lusaka 2001) and NEPAD Lusaka and Abuja 2001

The creation of the African Union in Sirte (Libya) in 1999 and the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in Lome (July 2000¹³) was an important milestone in the process of creating political continental unity and the African Economic Community. It was a major achievement of the African leaders and a triumph for Pan-Africanism.

Amongst the new principles of the African Union (AU) were: the right of the Union to intervene in matters relating to democratic principles, human rights and good governance, promotion of social justice and of gender equality in a member state. The development focus of the AU were similar to those of the LPA, yet nowhere in the Constitutive Act was NEPAD mentioned.

NEPAD was a merger (done in July 2001) of the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery Programme (MPA) and the Omega Plan, which gave birth to the New Africa Initiative (NAI). The NAI was approved by the OAU Summit of Heads of States and Governments in Lusaka, on July 2001. The NAI was then edited and its policy framework was finalised by the Heads of State Implementation Committee to become NEPAD.

¹³ OAU, Constitutive Act of the African Union, Addis Ababa, July 2001.

NEPAD's goals are to promote accelerated development, eradicate poverty and halt the marginalisation of Africa in the global process.

NEPAD claims to be:-

- a holistic integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa;
- a plan conceived and developed by African leaders;
- a commitment that African leaders are making to the African people;
- a commitment that African leaders are making to accelerate the integration of the African continent into the global economy;
- a call to the rest of the world to partner Africa in its own development.

Spokesmen for NEPAD are far from being modest as the following statement testifies: "Before NEPAD, the African landscape had been littered with failed initiatives, development plans and programmes of action. Of note were the regional initiatives of the Lagos Plan of Action (early 80s) and the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (early 90s). For a variety of reasons, including lack of capacity, lack of political will, outside interference and lack of resources, these past initiatives were unsuccessful. However, fortuitous convergence of circumstances, both within and outside the continent, has created the opportunity for the latest initiative"¹⁴.

Given the fact that the document of this quotation aimed at explaining NEPAD to a large and distinguished African gathering at the African Development Forum in Addis Ababa on March 7, 2002, the statement was rather overstating the possibility of NEPAD succeeding where others had failed. And this without so much as explaining what the "fortuitous convergence of circumstances" was which was to make NEPAD succeed where others had failed. It is not surprising, therefore, that NEPAD is drawing criticism especially from Civil Society Groups.

¹⁴ Ambassador I. Aluko-Olokun. The New Partnership for Africa's Development. Head, Nigeria NEPAD Team, Addis Ababa, March 2002.

Adedeji points out that NEPAD which does not refer to the AU Constitutive Act, is not mentioned in the AU Act. Both the Act and NEPAD have similar development sectors to focus on. “Are both intended to work along parallel lines? *The impression is given, perhaps inadvertently, that although the AU is the supreme body – having replaced the OAU – NEPAD is special and is not to be integrated into the AU. It has its own organs which are quite different from those of the AU.... How will the NEPAD Implementation Committee of Heads of States relate to the AU Executive Council? Will the NEPAD Secretariat now being set up, not in Addis Ababa but in Pretoria, remain a separate and independent entity? Will it be absorbed by the Commission of the Union ..? There are indeed many substantive issues where reconciliation and clarity is needed in the relationship between the AU and NEPAD*”(Adedeji, Nairobi, April 2002)¹⁵.

Apart from its status vis-à-vis the AU and Constitutive Act, NEPAD has been criticised on more substantial grounds. African scholars meeting in Accra in April 2002, stated in their Declaration, the following critique of NEPAD: -

“The most fundamental flaws of NEPAD which reproduces the central elements of the World bank’s *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* and the ECA’s *Compact for African Recovery*, include:

- (a) the neo-liberal policy framework at the heart of the plan, which repeats the structural adjustment policy packages of the preceding two decades and overlooks the disastrous effects of those policies;
- (b) the fact that, in spite of its proclaimed recognition of the central role of the African people to the plan, the African people have not played any part in the conception, design and formulation of the NEPAD;
- (c) notwithstanding its stated concerns for social and gender equity, it adopts the social and economic measures that have contributed to the marginalisation of women;

¹⁵ Adedeji, Adebayo; “From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African Development and from the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Whither Africa?” Keynote Address to the Conference on African Forum for Envisioning Africa Focus on NEPAD, Nairobi, April 2002.

- (d) that in spite of claims of African origin, its main targets are foreign donors, particularly in the G8;
- (e) its vision of democracy is defined by the needs of creating a functional market;
- (f) it under-emphasises the external conditions fundamental to Africa's development crisis, thereby not offering any meaningful measure to manage and restrict the effects of this environment on Africa's development efforts. On the contrary, the engagement that it seeks with institutions and processes like the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the United States' Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Cotonou Agreement, will further lock African economies disadvantageously into this environment;
- (g) the means for mobilisation of resources will further the disintegration of African economies witnessed as a result of structural adjustment and WTO rules.

And the African scholars having made a substantive critique of NEPAD, proceed to list strategies and policies which need to be pursued by African Governments in place of those suggested by NEPAD. What these scholars are calling for is essentially contrary to the fundamental philosophy and assumption behind NEPAD, and includes for example:

- (i) with regards to external environment, towards stabilisation of commodity prices; reform of the international financial system (to prevent debt, exchange rate instability and capital flow volatility), as well as of the WB and IMF; an end to IMF/WB structural adjustment; fundamental changes in the existing agreements of the WTO regime, etc.
- (ii) at the local, national and sub-regional levels, development policy must promote agriculture, industry and services, including health and public education – must be protected and supported through trade, investment and macro-economic policy measures. A strategy for financing must seek to mobilise and build on internal and intra-African resources through imaginative savings measures; reallocation of expenditure away from wasteful items, military expenditure, corruption ...etc.
- (iii) these measures require, above all, the reconstitution of the developmental state: a state for which social equity, social

inclusion, national unity and respect for human rights form the basis of economic policy....¹⁶

It is clear that the African scholars were not only critical of NEPAD but had definite alternative ideas (such as those mentioned above and others which have not been listed). And these ideas are a repeat of those in the Lagos Plan of Action twenty years after its first articulation and by a younger generation of African scholars. Ironically, many of the younger scholars who attended the Accra conference and came up with the above declaration may not have seen the Lagos Plan of Action document!

3. The External Visions

3.1. Colonial Visions at Independence

Since the colonisation of the continent, “externals” have had the upper hand in all matters to do with the economies of African countries. In the first place, the colonial powers laid down the structures of African countries modern economies. At the beginning, half way and towards the end of the colonial period, African economies were specifically designed to benefit metropolitan countries. This was irrespective of whether the resource base of a given African country was mineral resources, agriculture, land to be populated by colonial settlers or a combination of any of these resources. The result was the same i.e. an African economy that was outward oriented to suit the needs of metropolitan countries.

At independence, politically independent African countries found themselves tied to the metropolitan economies and the international economic system which former colonial powers and their allies – western European countries and North America (USA and Canada) – dominated. This, essentially meant that almost all technologies and industrial products of all kinds were produced in the Western countries who had a monopoly over these and set prices for African buyers. In addition, the West controlled most of small industries they started in African countries, including companies engaged in the exploitation of mineral resources. They controlled commodity markets and set the prices for all commodities produced by African economies. They further controlled the financial system and set interest rates and other conditions for African

¹⁶ CODESRIA-TWN Africa Declaration on the Challenges facing Africa, Accra, April 2002.

borrowing etc. Finally, the west controlled service e.g. insurance, industries and at the same time, provided the expertise and personnel to help African countries whose human resources were highly underdeveloped.

Needless to say, they advised African governments not to disturb this established economic structure and to continue with the inherited relationship with the international economic system. After all, this was the “natural” division of labour in the world and any attempt by African governments to change their economic strategies and policies to restructure or reorient this relationship to their advantage was quickly stopped by various instruments, Western countries wielded, and still wield, over African countries. These instruments varied from the manipulation of the financial system and of commodity prices against African countries to withdrawal of technical assistance and investment, and occasionally direct sanctions against non-conforming countries. In the face of this formidable power, most African countries continued to pursue economic policies and “development” in the way established by colonial powers. As noted earlier, by the end of the 1960s, the rapid economic growth initially observed in African countries began to slow down and foreign currency reserves started to be exhausted.

As the Cold War intensified and the ideological war of converting African countries heated up in the 1970s, externals increased in number beyond the number of former colonial powers. Externals now included the Americans (on behalf of the West), the Soviet Union (on behalf of the Communist East), Scandinavian countries (on behalf European social democracy) and China, (on behalf of Third World Communism). All these powers played their parts in trying to influence political and economic development of African countries. And the story of the internal struggle amongst externals for control of African countries, though important, is known only superficially.

What is of interest here is that this serious political and military struggle for African countries was accompanied by a heated ideological debate over alternative paths to development. The debate was not just confined to Capitalism and Marxism, but included several new ideas on possibilities of development in Third World countries. These different development paths included those advocated by the Dependency School of Latin America or those based on the Scandinavian Social Democratic experience, on the Chinese and Cuban experiences, and even on some of

the woolly ideas behind the UN Development Decades assessments. Added to this mixed pot were calls by African and Arab political leaders for African and Arab Socialism. In the end, what filtered to the rarefied atmosphere of the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments were Declarations, which contained a mild form of socialist ideas and a strong dose of nationalism. These ideas found expression in the support of strong public sector role, side by side with the private sector's; some basic social welfare system; self reliance and economic cooperation in order to reduce African countries' excessive dependence and to strengthen their bargaining power. These principles were to provide the framework for the strategies and policies to develop African economies in different sectors, including agriculture, industry, development of human and mineral resources, science and technology etc.

Thus, by the end of the 1970s, when most African countries were going through serious economic crises, the well-trodden path of economic policies intensified after independence became the obvious target of blame because it had failed to bring about any development. And when African government began to seriously think about what to do with the crises, a strong temptation was to: - (a) reject inherited economic policies and (b) welcome and accept as an alternative, the mixture of mild socialist and nationalist ideas which had a strong presence in intellectual circles and among some influential political leaders.

Hence, the 1979-1980 period saw the mobilisation of African intellectual and political resources to produce three landmark declarations: the Monrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980). As pointed out earlier, all new initiatives following these critical declarations were made within the framework of these Declarations, except that these simply added details about the nature and causes of the economic crises facing Africa and policies to be pursued in order to overcome the crises.

3.2 The World Bank's Berg Report (1981)

'Externals' – mainly Western countries – were rather alarmed by the anti-western language of the LPA and the radical ideas it proposed. In October 1981, the World Bank came out with a report called "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action"¹⁷ which it

¹⁷ World Bank. "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa", Washington, 1981.

claimed was prepared at the request of the Bank's African Governors. This report was clearly meant to bring about an improvement in the policies advocated by Western countries in Africa. According to the World Bank, if African countries followed the development strategy laid out for them in the Report, they would be able to pull out from the crises they had sunk into and experience "accelerated development". The Report's core strategy for accelerated economic development was for African governments to adopt an export-led growth strategy and to liberalise foreign trade.

The Berg Report, as it came to be known, was definitely a response to the LPA and its aim was to provide an intellectual basis for WB interventions and the initiation of adjustment programmes for African economies, ostensibly to bring them out of crises and lead them to accelerated development.

According to Bujra (1982), the Berg Report: (a) does not address the most crucial issues spelt out in the LPA;(b) advocates for increased (foreign and local) investment and a reduced public sector role, this being in direct contrast to the LPA which argues for an *expansion* of the public sector; (c) it gives scant and peripheral attention to important areas of development such as industrialisation, control and use of mineral resources, economic cooperation and integration. In fact, the issue of economic co-operation, a central concern of the LPA, is not mentioned at all in the Berg Report.

Despite these shortcomings of the Berg Report, the WB/IMF immediately went on with the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) recommended in the Berg Report in many African countries. It needs to be pointed out here that the World Bank and IMF were informed, in no uncertain terms, about the inappropriate assumptions lying behind SAPs and their probable negative effects. In 1987 and 1988, the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank organised five senior policy seminars on structural adjustment in Africa which were attended by ministers, governors, permanent secretaries, senior advisors and a large number of senior technical staff of central banks and core ministries of finance and planning, as well as ministries of agriculture and industry. Twenty-seven countries participated in these WB policy seminars, but the strong criticisms voiced by the African participants of these seminars were played down and expressed in the polite and

diplomatic language of the Bank in one of its Reports (EDI Policy Seminar Report No.18, Washington, D.C. 1989).

The quoted report referred to the critique of African participants of the seminars as main observations and lessons emerging from the seminars and expressed this critique in the following terms: -

1. Most participants perceived adjustment programs as imposed from outside;
2. Adjustment must be seen in a broader context, as involving medium and longer –term policies, in addition to immediate (stabilization) measures;
3. Basic Social services must be protected;
4. Current adjustment programs have yet to successfully reconcile demand management with supply-enhancing measures;
5. The promotion of sub-regional or regional trade and the coordination of development plans and strategies – a main objective of the LPA – have not received the attention they deserve;
6. Significant social costs are involved in adjustment programmes;
7. To be sustainable, adjustment programmes must be nationally designed and/or be designed to fit local conditions;
8. For many reasons, including the weak bargaining powers of African governments and their lack of indigenous capacity for policy formulation, international organizations have stepped in to currently set the agenda for policy reforms in Africa, with unfortunate consequences;
9. A long-term strategy based on export-led growth and the liberalization of foreign trade as advocated in the Berg Report has few adherents¹⁸ in Africa;

¹⁸ That the strategy 'has few adherents' is acknowledged in the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI) Report by Cadman Atta Mills entitled 'Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa'. EDI Seminar Report, Number 18, Washington, D.C. 1989.

10. The current African crisis has, to a considerable degree, its origins in the prevailing international economic environment;
11. Negotiations can be better handled to reduce tension between conditionality and national sovereignty;
12. Multilateral institutions should accept greater responsibility for failed programs¹⁹.

The African critique of SAPs was loud and clear from the beginning i.e. since SAPs were introduced in the early 1980s. That the WB articulated these criticisms openly by 1988 meant it had known about them much earlier. Yet, despite such prior knowledge, the WB/IMF proceeded with the implementation of SAPs, with only slight technical modifications here and there.

The adverse and negative impacts of SAPs are now well known, as are the strong reactions of African officials and intellectuals against SAPs. The most important formal reaction to SAPs was the ECA's 1989 African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAPs), already discussed in the context of African Initiatives. Amongst other sharp and serious critiques levelled against SAPs by African intellectuals (starting with SAPs genesis in the Berg Report) is Thandika Mkandawire's book "*Our Continent, our Future*" (1999).

By the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, externals' perspective for African development had become the dominant, if not the only directing principle of development in almost all African countries. Indeed the practical power of the WB/IMF and the Donor community, often collectively referred to as the international community, to intervene and direct plans, programmes, projects and actual decision making by African governments has become established and accepted in government circles today.

In the meantime in 1989, the WB came out with another report labelled "Long Term Perspective Studies (LTPS)" which proposed a global coalition of Donors and Africans to effectively direct the intellectual framework and strategies of long-term development in Africa. The Global Coalition for Africa was thus established and remains an organization or institution, which is still operating today. In the 1990s, however, the

¹⁹ Ibid, p. vii and viii.

international community began to intensify its coordination at different levels, without the participation of Africans. The WB/IMF, the EU, the DAC, individual donor countries, the Paris and London Clubs etc. started to coordinate and standardize their strategies and policies with regard to loans, debt, aid, trade, technical assistance etc. They insisted on African governments accepting conditionalities, which turned out to be the revised and elaborated conditionalities of SAPs, with the added political conditionality of Good Governance, later adopted by the UN System as a whole, but more particularly by the UNDP.

Thus, during the 1990s and the new millennium, African economic and political developments were being diplomatically but firmly guided by the 'international community'. At the more formal level of treaties, the EU continued with its Lome (now Cotonou) Convention (renewed and renegotiated every several years) in guiding unequal trade relations between African and EU countries. More recently, the Americans have come up with their own programme i.e. the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Interestingly, the British and French (the two largest and most powerful former colonial powers) have also recently decided to synchronise and coordinate their African policies, to the extent that their African Ambassadors hold joint meetings annually or biannually.

And once again, in the year 2000, the WB in association with international community partners, has come up with yet another document – this time appearing in the form of a book – entitled “Can Africa Reclaim the 21st Century?”²⁰. This book essentially articulates long-term strategies of African development, from the perspective of the WB and the rest of the Donor community. It is expected to provide the intellectual inspiration for African policy makers to formulate their development strategies.

And indeed, according to the CODESRIA-TWN Africa's recent Declaration²¹, NEPAD, the latest African vision and initiative for African Development, derives its intellectual inspiration and strategies from this recently published WB book. Similar arguments and statements, as those of the CODESRIA-TWN Conference, were made at another conference of

²⁰ World Bank. 'Can Africa Reclaim the 21st Century?'. Washington, D.C. 2000.

²¹ CODESRIA-TWN Africa Declaration of a Conference on 'Africa's Development Challenges', Accra, 26 April 2002.

African scholars held in Nairobi at about the same time (26-29 April, 2002)²².

As is clear, internal and external visions of African development have existed since the early years of independence. These visions have, however, differed fundamentally in terms of the development strategies they advocated. And the present dominance of the external vision of African development simply reflects the reality of Africa's weakness and the strength of external powers.

4. Conclusion

The first major OAU Initiative on *Economic Development* started with the Monrovia/LPA in 1979/80. Before then, the OAU was mainly concerned with inter-state relations and the politics of decolonisation. At this point, two simple questions arise with regard to these initiatives. Firstly, why were/are OAU Initiatives different from those driven by the externals? And secondly, why do African Heads of States subscribe to radical development approaches at the OAU level, but fail to implement these at the national level? The answers to these questions are complex, but can partly be found in the following explanations: -

- (i) During the first 15 years of independence, there was a strong presence of former colonial powers in African countries, be this in terms of technical personnel, aid and strong political ties between former colonial governments and the African political leadership. The influence of the metropolitan governments on their former African colonies and their economic policies was essentially direct. By the end of the 1970s, as Africa was facing a serious economic crisis, the direct influence of former colonial powers began to weaken, or rather to change form.
- (ii) In the 1960s, African economies were doing quite well. They generally had relatively plentiful foreign currency reserves and the emerging class of African businessmen accumulating wealth through the state institutions was very optimistic about the future. This emerging class favoured the pursuance of

²² African Forum for Envisioning Africa's Focus on NEPAD, Organised by Mazingira Institute, African Academy of Science and the Heinrich Boll Foundation, 26-29 April 2002, Nairobi, Kenya.

policies recommended by colonial advisors and the continuity of economic structures that prevailed under previous colonial rule, without any radical changes. Where some African governments tried to adopt some radical approach to development and to change the existing economic structure through nationalisation and diversification of external economic links, there was immediate and strong media reaction, diplomatic isolation and economic pressure to halt such 'move to the left' which was essentially perceived as economically disruptive. Such reaction was witnessed in Tanzania, Guinea Conakry, Ghana (under Nkrumah), Congo Kinshasa (under Lumumba), Benin, Somalia and Uganda (under Obote I).

- (iii) The second half of the 1970s saw the economic crisis intensifying all over the African continent. There were serious rumblings among the population and especially the military. In many countries, the military took power and this led to a worsening of the economic and political situation. In response to this, the OAU began to take up economic development as part of its mandate and soon initiated discussion on development issues. Similarly, the UNECA began to be more active than before in tackling development issues. As mentioned in earlier sections of this paper, these changes took place in the context of the strong ideological debate of the 1970s regarding alternative paths of development for Africa. The OAU's language and perspective absorbed some basic ideas of the ongoing debate, which tended to reinforce strong feelings of continental nationalism, at the root of the OAU's very existence, and leaned towards alternatives to existing development approaches. African political leaders themselves found it easier to accept such alternative approaches to development because they saw on the ground, in their own countries, the drawbacks of approaches inherited from former colonial powers.
- (iv) Yet, at country level, most political leaders found it extremely hard to debunk or reject prevailing economic policies because: (a) the cost of disruption resulting from such a change was too great, (b) the power of the emerging African

economic elite within the existing political and administrative structures was too strong and favoured continuity of previous policies, including rent seeking behaviour and artificial shortages from which some elite groups gained economically, and (c) the power and influence of the 'externals' was also very strong and, allied with some local groups, threatened to disrupt the economies of African countries in the event continuity was questioned. As a result, it was easier for Heads of States to continue with the inherited economic policies and strategies at the country level while, at the same time, endorsing radical alternative economic strategies and policies at the OAU level. Schizophrenia became a standard political behaviour among African political leaders, a breakdown occurring between OAU resolutions, with distinct pan-African leanings, and actions taken at country level. In this respect, the following statement by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is particularly apt: *'African states have been given names such as neopatrimonial, prebentual, vampire and various other exotic names. The underlying fact is that African states are systems of patronage and are closely associated with rent-seeking activities. Their external relationship is designed to generate funds that oil this network of patronage. Their trading system is designed to collect revenue to oil the system. Much of the productive activity is mired in a system of irrational licenses and protection that is designed to augment the possibilities of rent collection. Much of the private sector in the continent is an active and central element of this network of patronage and rent-seeking activity'*.

- (v) Given this situation, the more the crisis deepened in Africa and the more countries became indebted, the easier it became for the externals to ensure that the traditional economic strategies and policies inherited from the colonial period continued to prevail. Indeed, as the crisis deepened and African countries became weaker, the externals had a unique opportunity to intervene strongly at country level and to direct economic strategies and policies, often literally managing and administering key institutions in African economies. This was particularly the case in much of the 1980s and some would

even argue this continues to be the case at present – at least in many smaller countries of Africa.

- (vi) However, this strong interventionist role of the ‘externals’ had to have an ideological and intellectual basis in the new era. And this was provided by the WB and IMF through their various strategic reports (at country level) and major publications on Africa. These included the *Berg Report (1981)*, the *Long Term Perspective Studies (1989)*, *Adjustment in Africa (1994)* and more recently, *Can Africa Reclaim the 21st Century? (2000)*.
- (vii) At the cost of repetition, it is necessary to point out at this stage that there is a fundamental difference between all pre-NEPAD African Initiatives (especially since the Monrovia/LPA of 1979/80) and the NEPAD initiative of 2001/2. All pre-NEPAD African initiatives had, at the core of their plans/agendas, the following principles which, needless to say, are absent from NEPAD:-
- a. Self-reliance as an organising principle of economic and other forms of development;
 - b. Equality as a fundamental principle and goal of economic development;
 - c. A strong role for the public sector;
 - d. The continuous interrogation of the present international economic order and the fight, by various methods, for a NIEO;
 - e. Much stronger efforts towards economic co-operation and integration.

From the perspective of the ‘externals’, the above principles obviously make African initiatives radical and ‘ideological’ i.e. leftist. More importantly, if African countries were to practically follow these principles, African economies would become difficult to exploit and bring under the hegemony of external powers driving globalisation. Hence, the strong opposition of the ‘externals’ to African initiatives and, since NEPAD has dropped any pretence to following the above principles, it is

not surprising that the G8 have welcomed it with open arms and given it moral support so far.

Finally, the African people and even the peoples of the 'externals' are nowhere to be seen in this struggle for the development soul of the African continent.

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